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ARTICLE INFO                                         ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper, inspired by a postmodern reconceptualization of truth and 
the deconstruction of objectivity, I critique the notion of western-
inspired psychotherapy as neutral, universal, apolitical, and normative 
for all cultures and groups. This value-free idea of clinical praxis, I 
argue, would advantageously give way to understandings that re-vision 
the therapeutic encounter as a deeply political context – subject to the 
vulnerabilities of normal social interactions. Consequently, in view of 
increasingly credible ideas about the embeddedness of human 
experience, the subjectivity that must attend ‘scientific’ work, and the 
deconstruction of hegemonies as givens, I frame the crises currently 
facing orthodox psychotherapeutic praxis, and challenge its assumed 
superiority over local espousals of mental distress. This is done in the 
hope that a new space for more pluralistic forms of therapy might 
evolve unconstrained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mainstream psychotherapy, a largely western 
phenomenon (Samuels, 2005; Ryde, 2005), is 
popularly conceived and practiced in terms of 
unilinear clinician-client dyadic encounters. In the 
psychotherapy room, identities endemic to the 
therapeutic alliance are often assumed: the 
psychotherapist becomes the expert-healer who 
must use her special knowledge to alleviate the 
problems of her client; the individual client 
becomes the passive recipient of the 
psychotherapist’s expertise, and must submit to her 
interpretations and perspectives.  
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The focus of therapy is on helping the individual 
make rational decisions, and achieve a state of 
maturity and independence (Ryde, 2005). Therapy 
is often deemed successful when the individual 
faithfully follows the instructions of the therapist, 
and adheres to the contractual agreements unique 
to the alliance. In other words, ‘the self needs 
fixing’, and the traditionally western-inspired 
clinician-client therapeutic configuration provides 
a supposedly politically-neutral, value-free, 
scientific space to enact healing irrespective of the 
context in which it is practiced. At least in practice, 
this neutrality and professional isolation from the 
volatility of politics and power is often assumed 
(Totton, 2005). This western expertise, with its 
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attendant interpretations, standards, discourses and 
models, are then taken as a universally accurate 
picture of mental healthcare. Not lightly motivated 
by postmodern critiques of truth and objectivity, as 
well as the social constructionist insights into the 
political/cultural/social/historical embeddedness of 
human experience, different understandings of 
clinical praxis are gaining compelling audiences.  
 
     The issues of concern that have enlivened 
discourse about clinical praxis border on the 
suitability of western conceptions of mental health 
and illness for all other cultures, the belief that we 
are actually healing our clients – that is, the 
validity of expertise and, not least important, the 
idea that we can attain to any objective 
conceptualization of human experience in much the 
same ways that have arguably proved beneficial to 
scientists who deal with the physical world. 
Current trends, such as terminated clinical 
appointments and an observed unwillingness of 
certain minorities (such as African Americans) to 
participate in western configurations of therapy 
(Yeh, Hunter, Madan-Bahel, Chiang and Arora, 
2004), are also influential in contributing to the 
present critical moment. For the purposes of rigour, 
these issues, presented above, might be reframed 
(if it might be said without levity that there are 
palpable tensions of opinion brewing in the 
therapeutic franchise) as the crisis of centrality, the 
crisis of neutrality, and the crisis of objectivity 
respectively. What might be called the ‘politics of 
psychotherapy’ is one of the central themes of this 
paper – alongside postmodern / social 
constructionist reinterpretations (and the messy 
complexities introduced) of this very human 
institution. Psychotherapy is not politically neutral 
or free from stubborn power issues as previously 
supposed. Sands (2003; in Totton, 2005) states: 
Psychotherapy is the only profession where the 
practitioner can be insensitive, evasive, 
patronising, arrogant, discourteous, self-righteous 
or just plain wrong and where clients’ observations 
of this can be taken to be an expression of their 
problems, evidence that what they really need is 
more of the same therapy. 
 
     Consequently, there is a growing realization 
among practitioners that the practice of 
psychotherapy is just as vulnerable to the abuse of 
power as other forms of social encounters. Far 
from being a positivistic science that neatly 
demarcates (as chemists would attempt to isolate 
the chemical properties of a liquid) and objectifies 
mental illness and health, therapy is situated within 
the hermeneutic nexuses of powerful interests and 
conventional discourses on what counts as distress 
and normality. Paradigms determine, constrain, and 
contain thinking patterns; if psychotherapists are 
situated within these paradigms, then it is not 
difficult to see how fragile the supposedly 
invulnerable praxis of therapy really is. Further 
still, the concerns discussed herein may have more 
to do with the very idea of psychotherapy and its 
concomitant configurations than with the 
psychotherapists themselves. This paper explores 
these issues, and problematizes – alongside other 
notions – the assumptions of neutrality and 
universal expertise, the assumptions that a 
particular conceptualization of mental illness is, on 
the strength of its being labelled ‘scientific’ and 
‘global’, superior to local understandings of 
distress, as well as the assumptions that therapy is 
apolitical, value-free, neutral, and not often the 
imbalanced power relations context many are 
beginning to perceive it as.  
 
The Paradigmatic Discourses of Psychotherapy 
 
To begin, this section explores, albeit summarily, 
the historical antecedents and the dynamic currents 
of theories and perspectives that have given rise to 
western psychotherapy and its closely affiliated 
profession, psychiatry. The focus is placed on the 
epistemological foundations of the professions. As 
such, some deeply philosophical issues are 
discussed. At first this recourse into ‘philosophy’ 
might seem uncalled for in today’s scientific 
circles, it is anything but. As Ingleby (1981) 
asserts, researchers have often sidestepped 
conceptual clarity for greater experimental 
sophistication. The present paradoxes and chaos 
that clinical psychology and the specialized 
profession of psychotherapy is faced with would 
demand that practitioners explore how they have 
constructed the discipline over time. Thus, to think 
about how clinical psychology has operated 
historically, it is important to recognise the 
underlying influence of paradigms, which may be 
roughly construed as mentalities or systems of 
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thought with a set of assumptions that constrain 
and predispose adherents to perceive ‘objects’ in 
particular ways. Paradigms are ‘whole systems of 
prejudice about what constitutes useful and 
respectable data, what form theories should take, 
what sort of language scientists should use, how 
they should go about their business, and so on’ 
(Ingleby, 1981). Kuhn (1970) popularized the 
notion of paradigms and their influence on the 
business of science. Contrary to hitherto held 
understandings about the nature of scientific 
change and progress, Kuhn posited that scientific 
activity of any sort is deeply embedded in socio-
political systems with preferences and power 
interests. His ‘close examination of the history of 
science showed that the grounds on which one 
paradigm is preferred to another are not exclusively 
scientific ones: the determinants of that choice lie 
to a large extent outside science, in social and 
psychological factors’ (Ingleby, 1981).  
 
     A term I prefer, which is closely allied with the 
notion of a ‘paradigm’, is ‘discourse’. The term, 
‘discourse’, in keeping with the social 
constructivist tradition, captures the linguistically 
constructed nature of these frameworks (Botella, 
1997). That is, according to social constructivist 
accounts of ‘reality’, objects do not precede, and 
are not independent of, discourse; objects have no 
extralinguistic referent, but are co-created in the 
very act of discourse. In this sense, as Botella 
(1997) states, we can no longer ask the question, 
‘what is a human being’, which is an essentialist 
enquiry. Instead it seems more appropriate to ask 
‘what kind of human being is constructed by our 
theoretical discourse?’ It is possible, then, to 
distinguish between a discourse of objectivism and 
a discourse of constructivism (Botella, 1997) in 
clinical psychology and psychotherapy.  
 
     The former, variously referred to as positivism, 
is characterized by the assumption that reality 
exists beyond, and is independent of, the observer. 
There is the observer and the observed, and the 
distance that must be traversed between them is a 
neutral set of procedures and expertise best 
encapsulated in what we now term ‘the scientific 
method’. Accordingly, accessing ‘objective’ and 
universal knowledge of reality is possible; all that 
is required is the correct application of certain 
protocol to contain the subjectivity of the observer. 
Thus, according to Kerlinger (1979; in Smith & 
Deemer, 2000), ‘the procedures of science are 
objective – not the scientists. Scientists, like all 
men and women are opinionated, dogmatic, 
ideological...that is the very reason for insisting on 
procedural objectivity; to get the whole business 
outside of ourselves’. The discourse of 
objectivism/positivism posits a singular external 
referent – the knowledge of and access to which is 
available to those who have mastered this 
‘procedural objectivity’. Every knowledge claim 
that falls beyond the predetermined operational and 
conceptual boundaries of this ‘procedure’ is not 
considered knowledge, but merely belief – which 
ultimately falls short of truth (Kirk, 1999). 
Consequently, the concept of truth as 
correspondence with reality and the notion of 
expertise stems from this paradigm. From the 
positivist perspective, truth is the accurate 
representation or an internalized form of external 
reality, and expertise is procedural proficiency or 
the set of skills needed to effectively translate and 
apply internalized reality (or truth) in meaningful 
ways. As Botella (1997) affirms, ‘when applied to 
clinical psychology and psychotherapy, this 
discourse carries not only epistemological 
implications, but also methodological, technical, 
and ethical ones.’  
 
     Though the alternative, the discourse of 
constructivism, represents a kaleidoscopic array of 
perspectives (that have been variously referred to 
as constructionist, interpretive, narrative, 
postmodern, post-colonial, dialogical, discursive), 
some ‘core’ assumptions of the many strands are a 
disavowal of any notion of objective truth and its 
attendant ideas of procedural/empirical objectivity, 
and the assertion that truth is not an external 
referent to which humans may relate to gain 
epistemic privileges and, consequently, expertise. 
Additionally, practitioners within this paradigm 
believe that knowledge is a social construction, co-
created and situated within local moral orders; that 
is, knowledge is framework dependent (Smith & 
Deemer, 2000). What humans affectionately refer 
to as reality is not ‘out there’ in the sense of having 
an existence independent of our perception of it; 
reality is a dialogic ‘product’, the dynamic 
evolution of our situated linguistic heritages and 
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potentials. In a very vital sense, we speak ‘reality’ 
to being; hence, the notion of objectivity is itself a 
myth and a social construction that is embodied and 
embedded in politically dense, culturally biased, 
historically situated spaces. The consequence is 
obvious: there are no value-free observations;           
the quest for objective truth is defeated from the 
outset–for if observation is ‘tainted’ by the 
observer (that is, if all observation is theory-laden, 
framework dependent, and political), then access to 
‘raw data’ or the empirical referent is undermined.  
 
     The very act of experiencing is not to be neutral, 
is to be implicated, is to be involved (thus, 
empirical neutrality is impossible). The only way 
to obtain ‘objective truth’, so it seems, is to 
somehow step out of one’s experience, and yet act 
in experience. Exploring the practical implications 
of this paradigm for clinical psychology and 
psychotherapy are beyond the objectives of this 
paper. However, it is important to note that the 
implications/consequences are ‘real’ – not merely 
philosophical and, as some researchers might be 
led to believe, impotent. 
 
     The practice of psychotherapy and its close 
affiliate, psychiatry, are largely in a state of crisis 
today. Questions that continue to express concerns 
about the future of the professions reflect the 
evolving volatility of the field. As mentioned in the 
preceding pages, there are deep and troubling 
contentions that have to do with 
defining/conceptualizing mental illness in the first 
instance (or even demonstrating its existence), 
deciding what methods or methodology is 
appropriate for research, and judging the efficacy 
of treatment. The emergent field of anti-psychiatry, 
partly motivated by Thomas Szasz’s critique of the 
mental health professions (Szasz, 2001), takes up 
issue with the predominant bio-medical model that 
informs much of clinical practice – stating that its 
emphasis on the diagnosis and treatment of ‘mental 
illness’ is undue and ill-founded. Szasz (2001) calls 
mental illness the ‘phlogiston’ of psychiatry, 
positing that ‘in [the] act of medicalization lies the 
root error of psychiatry’. Ingleby (1981) however 
believes that the real issue to grapple is the 
positivist orientation of the profession. The real 
problem of clinical psychology is its uncritical 
alliance with Auguste Comte’s brainchild, 
positivism. He suggests that early psychologists 
and psychiatrists, in a historical milieu that 
celebrated the perceived successes and progress of 
the physical sciences, would have been pressured 
to ‘conform’. These early researchers ‘could not 
afford to isolate themselves from [the model of the 
natural sciences] by challenging its positivist 
assumptions’. Hence, psychotherapists and mental 
health researchers today have inherited a paradigm 
that is largely positivist in configuration. But is this 
a problem, and why? Are there reasons to believe 
these paradigmatic controversies have led the 
affiliated fields of psychotherapy and psychiatry to 
critical moments where a paradigm shift is 
desirable? Is psychotherapy in a state of crisis due 
to its positivist backdrop? How can we correct the 
anomalies in clinical praxis? 
 
The Crisis of Objectivity 
 
Positivism assumes the ‘givenness’ of an 
accessible reality. This empirical referent is 
universal, global and, through the use of reason 
(conceptualized as ‘the scientific method’), can 
become knowledge to the observer. Every other 
knowledge claim that does not satisfy the empirical 
standards of the scientific method is not considered 
knowledge, but mere belief.  
 
     In a broad sense, positivism is the philosophical 
expression of scientism, the view that empirical 
science is the primary cultural institution, the only 
one that produces clear, objective, reliable 
knowledge claims about nature and society that 
accumulate over time and thereby the only 
enterprise that escapes the contingencies of 
history. For positivists, that reliability is 
proportional to the proximity of claims to observed 
facts—the empirical basis of knowledge. Every 
substantive claim not tested by experience is sheer 
human fabrication (Nickles, 2005).  
 
     Mainstream psychology today is largely 
informed by such positivist assumptions. Zayed 
(2008) states that positivism ‘presupposes the 
neutrality of observation, the “givenness” of 
experience, the independence of empirical data 
from theoretical frameworks, and the ideal of a 
univocal language. As such, it clearly demarcates 
the scientific enterprise from qualitative and 
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interpretive disciplines, and implies that its view is 
the privileged one regarding knowledge.’ 
Translated into the therapeutic context, these 
‘pretensions to objectivity’ (Ingleby, 1981) 
manifest as a certain professional aloofness and 
‘removed-ness’, a contrived distancing of the self 
from the entanglements of sentiments and 
subjectivity. Mainstream psychotherapists often 
work with the idea that their diagnoses and 
prescriptions for health are derived from 
‘objective’ and unbiased assessments. Nothing 
could be farther from what actually obtains. The 
postmodern critique of ‘procedural objectivity’ 
enunciates the impossibility of assuming a ‘God’s 
eye point of view’ or a ‘view from nowhere’. The 
modernist postulations about the objective realm 
naively leave out that experience is necessarily 
situated and embodied. Every observer is a               
by-product of dynamic influences within a locality             
– hence, there is no possibility for an ‘objective’ 
viewpoint. Observation is an exercise in bias. It 
might be instructive to trace the notions of an 
objective realm to Cartesian (in the Enlightenment 
era) dualism (Guba and Lincoln, 2000). 
Polkinghorne (1989; in Guba and Lincoln, 2000) 
comments:  
 
     The idea that the objective realm is independent 
of the knower’s subjective experiences of it can be 
found in Descartes’s dual substance theory, with 
its distinction between the objective and subjective 
realms....In the splitting of reality into subject and 
object realms, what can be known ‘objectively’ is 
only the objective realm. True knowledge is limited 
to the objects and the relationships between them 
that exist in realm of space and time.  
      
       Rene Descartes, arguably the father of modern 
philosophy, had a machine-like view of reality. 
Everything operated mechanically in complex 
cause and effect relationships. The soul, alone, was 
removed from this billiard-ball scenario. Cartesian 
dualism split ‘reality’ into two – the knower and 
the known, effectively creating a wide gulf 
between the two substantive realms. The problem 
his intellectual descendants were faced with was 
how to reconnect the two realms. In other words, 
how is ‘true’ knowledge of the ‘objective’ realm 
possible? Today, truth and knowledge are now 
seen ‘as the end product of rational processes, as 
the result of experiential sensing, as the result of 
empirical observations, and others’ (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2000). However, this construction of truth 
and knowledge as access to a so-called objective 
realm has been shown to be naive and elitist. A 
theoretical objective realm would require less (or 
more) than humans to access it. This is because 
humans operate from within traditions, and are 
storied beings. The notion of truth and its assumed 
imperviousness must give way to a more realistic 
view, one which affirms the highly politicized, 
local, and acculturated notion of ‘truth’. Indeed the 
notion of truth has fallen on hard times in a 
sceptical postmodern age, ‘when honouring 
multiple perspectives and diverse points of view 
has gained ascendancy in reaction to the oppressive 
authoritarianism and dogmatism that seemed so 
often to accompany claims of having found Truth’ 
(Patton, 2002).  
 
     Social constructivists, in an attempt to free up 
space for this multiplicity of perspectives and 
narratives, view ‘truth’ as consensus. Of course, 
the question might be asked: how do we judge the 
quality of praxis and perspectives since it seems 
constructivism avows the equal merit of all 
perspectives? For the researcher situated in the 
discourse of objectivism, the concepts of validity 
and reliability are important. The critical moment 
these paradigmatic controversies help practitioners 
realize is the assortment of criteria available to us: 
we need not ascribe to the demands of validity and 
reliability as ‘objective criteria’, for there are no 
such things. Criterion-setting is just as well a social 
construction; local groups must decide what is 
important to their interests, and make judgments 
appropriately.  
    
     The crisis of objectivity in mainstream clinical 
praxis is the realization that there are no objective 
criteria for making judgments and, much more 
importantly, there is no empirical reference point 
from which the psychotherapist supposedly draws 
insight about his clients’ situations. The diagnosis 
of psychopathology, the aetiology of distress, and 
nosology of ‘diseases’ are social devices that have 
evolved from political, historical and social 
constraints. In a sense, mainstream psychotherapy 
is an exercise reflecting one of many perspectives 
about the human person, what mental illness is, and 
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how to get rid of it. It is by no means the default 
configuration for enacting healing contexts. 
 
The Crisis of Neutrality 
 
Following the considerations about the non-
absoluteness of ‘truth’ (and the consequences of 
this ‘liberation’ in terms of the polyvocality of 
perspectives and praxis that suddenly come to bear) 
is the need to deconstruct the notion of expertise, 
which draws its plausibility from the defunct 
modernist/positivist epistemological project.  
 
     The expert is a person skilled in a particular 
discipline, possesses procedural proficiency, and 
may be relied on – more or less – as an authority in 
his/her field of discourse. There is a certain 
grounding that is believed to elevate the expert (in 
this case, the psychotherapist), giving her the upper 
hand and privilege over the non-expert (the client 
seeking help). In conventional clinical praxis, one 
of the major tools that grants a psychotherapist 
expertise and legitimizes the therapeutic context is 
the DSM IV nosology. Proficiency with the DSM 
IV grants the context a certain sort of predictability 
and confidence (Gergen, 1996). This is because 
diagnosis and prognosis are, arguably, the 
psychotherapeutic expert’s most critical tasks. 
From a modernist perspective, this is all very much 
in order; a diagnosis presumes the stability of 
forms, objects of inquiry and methods of inquiry. A 
diagnosis assumes that language is 
representational, and can accurately depict 
‘reality’. The clinical expert is so called because of 
his access to this pathological referent in reality; 
he, the expert, uses his knowledge to help the non-
expert. Consequently, the expert actively (and 
hopefully) communicates a ‘true’ diagnosis to a 
largely passive recipient of this expertise. Herein is 
where the danger lies.   
 
     From a social constructionist perspective, there 
are no ‘true’ diagnoses, in terms of an accurate 
representation of an objective pathological 
condition in time/space. Reality is dialogic, 
discursive and interpretive. Diagnoses ‘are socially 
constructed meanings put forth by the dominant 
professional culture. A diagnosis is an agreement 
to make sense of some behaviour or event in a 
particular way’ (Gergen, 1996). Hence, the 
‘diagnostic reality’ is not an empirical fact but a 
linguistic-relational co-creation. The emphasis then 
is not on how ‘true’ a diagnosis is, since there are 
no objective referents by which that qualitative 
judgment may be made; the focus is on the 
mutuality and the participatory space dialogue 
frees up. Gergen (1996) comments: 
 
Social constructionism invites alternative 
questions: What is the intent of a diagnosis? What 
questions are believed to be answered by 
diagnosis? What information is thought to be 
gained? What does one want a diagnosis to 
communicate and to whom? If there are many ways 
to think about, to describe what may be thought of 
as the same thing (i.e., behaviors, feeling), how can 
we respect and work within all realities? Should 
we consider the possibility of multiple diagnoses? 
How can we bring the client into the process? How 
can, and is it possible, for a diagnosis to be 
meaningful for all involved? How can it be 
collaborative, tailored to the individual, useful? 
What other words can we use? If we reject 
diagnostic terms, should we try to persuade the 
helping system to change its nosology? How do we 
develop a way in which multiverses can co-exist? If 
one views life as dynamic, unstable, and 
unpredictable then inquiry about it must be ever 
active. If one views knowledge as socially created 
and knowledge and knowers as interdependent, 
then it makes sense to include the client in the 
diagnostic process. This moves diagnosis from the 
realm of a private discourse to a shared inquiry in 
which diagnosis becomes a mutual discovery 
process. 
 
     The absence of an absolute realm of knowable 
objects deals a deadly blow to the notion of clinical 
expertise. Without an absolute diagnostic referent, 
we are compelled to focus on relationships formed 
instead. Certainty and predictability are obviously 
compromised in a constructionist paradigm; 
however, if life is viewed as unstable, volatile and 
dynamic, the predictability offered by the 
modernist view becomes problematic. The 
dichotomization of expert/non-expert, which the 
DSM IV requires and assumes, also introduces 
other complexities, which may be collectively 
referred to as the ‘politics of psychotherapy’. When 
conceived in terms of its relational dynamics, 
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conventional psychotherapy could be 
conceptualized as a very oppressive context indeed. 
The imbalance of power, the privileging of 
epistemic forms over another, the silencing of 
client narratives and perspectives, the forced 
medicalization of mental illness, the 
institutionalized passiveness of healthcare 
recipients, and the instances of sexual exploitation 
reported in clinical contexts are recurrent features 
of traditional praxis. Many researchers have begun 
to draw attention to the ‘structural problems of the 
therapy relationship’ (Ryde, 2005), some of which 
are psychotherapy’s undue focus on the 
‘individual’ in sharp contrast to society (bolstered 
by the western myth of individuality), the unspoken 
imbalance of power in the therapy relationship, and 
the suppression of the perspectives of clients. 
Foucault (1980, in Totton, 2005) argued that 
mainstream healing professions are social 
normalizing devices that exert power over forms of 
behaviour that do not fit cultural appraisals of 
‘normality’. There are power interests at stake in 
the western psychotherapy session that transcend 
the economic aspirations of drug manufacturing 
firms; worldviews are at stake. In a very real sense 
then, western psychotherapy is a political process 
within a larger culture that prescribes what 
normality should look like. ‘In other words, there is 
no political neutrality, since politics permeates our 
social experience’ (Totton, 2005). 
 
     A deconstructed view of expertise must situate 
it within its local bailiwick of relevance; the 
proficiency implied in expertise has nothing to do 
with an external world of diagnostic significance – 
for such a world is merely a social construction 
with its attendant power dynamics. The western-
type clinician has no privileged or advantage over 
other forms of healing configurations. Moreover, 
the rigid distinction between expert and non-expert, 
in the post-structuralist moment, becomes fuzzy 
and blurry. To conclude this section, we 
(practitioners, clinicians, researchers and the 
public) must recognize that ‘there is no absolute 
truth, that truth is not singular but plural and 
contingent, and, therefore, subject to negotiation. 
This is perhaps the greatest realization of 
modernity and of immeasurable political 
importance’ (Totton, 2005). What might this 
realization augur for the profession?   
The Crisis of Centrality 
 
If mainstream (western) therapy has no epistemic 
or procedural privileges over other forms of 
therapy, and the ‘expert’ and his tool (the DSM IV) 
is just one of many ways a therapeutic interaction 
can be built (itself having no privileged access to 
an objective diagnostic referent), it seems the next 
obvious action is to ask the question: where are the 
many other ways of enacting healing? 
 
     The postmodern moment affords us 
practitioners a practical opportunity to critique the 
suitability of western therapy for all cultures. 
Hitherto, some kind of lip-service has been paid to 
the growing cross-cultural sensitivity within 
therapy discourse. The assumptions about the 
default nature of western psychotherapy however 
remained; the modernist presuppositions about 
western access to an objective aetiological referent 
were constant. What is needed today is more than a 
mere addition to the default (Ingleby, 1981); what 
is needed is a decentering of therapeutic discourse. 
We (in reference to practitioners and the concerned 
public) can no longer continue to pretend that 
mainstream therapy meets the needs of all people – 
for if ‘psychotherapy’ loosely defined is 
intersubjective activity, made possible by dialogue 
and discourse, then it is necessarily an exercise in 
narratives and story-telling. The consequent 
realization is that we, Africans, must tell our own 
stories, and enact our own healing contexts. The 
need is evidenced by growing reports about the 
refusal of people of heterogeneous cultures to 
engage in mainstream therapy and an increasingly 
influential call for culturally-sensitive therapy 
(Akinsete, 2002, in Totton, 2005). What is needed 
today is the re-enactment of indigenous knowledge 
systems, hitherto silenced by the monolithic 
predominance of western paradigms.  
 
It’s a Local Thing: Promoting Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems 
 
The crises of objectivity, neutrality and centrality, 
brought to the fore by the deconstructive prowess 
of the postmodern moment affords a new moment 
for the decentralization of therapy discourse and 
the emergence of pluralistic conceptions of truth, 
human experience, distress, healing and human 
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flourishing. The realization is deafening: wellbeing 
is a local thing. Suddenly, the ‘native’ forms of 
healing do not seem trivial and embryonic 
anymore. Indeed, in place of the singular dyadic 
configuration comes potentially infinite spaces for 
healing that are contingent upon the local moral 
orders and worldviews, and are significant to local 
adherents.  
 
     There is a real need to address the silence in 
African contexts. The discourse of constructivism 
affords us a new thrilling ethos to engage the 
narratives and worlds of indigenous people, 
facilitating discourse, and then evolving locally 
sensitive non-western ‘therapy’. The ‘sudden’ 
diversity of perspectives that potentially replace the 
monolith of western therapy may be unsettling – 
but it is a thrilling source of creative expression 
that is more in keeping with our emergent 
understandings of human experience (Maree, 
Ebersohn, & Molepo, 2006). Different researchers 
are exploring the indigenization of therapy – 
opening up new pathways to different, more 
holistic, more sacred/spiritual conceptions of 
wellbeing not available in the modernist moment 
(Ebigbo, 1997 is a case in point). We must 
continue to do this – so long as the academic 
institutions are willing to accommodate creative 
new forms of inquiry and research. The 
possibilities are endless.     
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that mainstream therapy does not 
possess, as once assumed, a privileged link to an 
objective world of diagnostic / psychopathological 
referents. This is simply because no such world 
exists. In place of a politically neutral, value-free, 
objective praxis, we realize that conventional 
praxis is theory-laden, embodied, politically 
driven, and, to our modernist dismay, one of many 
possible social constructions possible in a dialogic 
reality. Observation always involves interpretation, 
and theories are never completely dictated by the 
‘facts’ (Ingleby, 1981). The empirical project, now 
defunct, must inspire new ways of doing therapy. 
The need today is for academics to re-examine 
their practice in relation to the needs of the public 
they serve. The realization of the now obvious 
politicization of psychotherapy (thanks to 
postmodern insight) does not mean that we should 
do away with western psychotherapy; however, it 
does mean we must do away with it being the 
default, the central discourse, or the praxis of 
reference. African practitioners must critically 
assess their allegiance to western therapy, and 
strive to connect with their communities and their 
indigenous knowledge paradigms in order to 
develop culture-sensitive approaches to wellbeing. 
The proverbial cat was never in the bag; there has 
never been an objective referent to which we may 
aspire to in order to gain competence, and there 
never will be. We are left with the uncertainty, 
vulnerability, chaos, relativism, and 
unpredictability that modernism eschewed. And, in 
a very queer way, this does not appear disturbing 
after all. 
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